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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present under uncertainty, and in an ordinal framework,
an axiomatic treatment of the Sugeno integral in terms of preferences which parallels
some earlier derivations devoted to the Choquet integral. Some emphasis is given
to the characterization of uncertainty aversion.
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1 Introduction
Under uncertainty the paradox of Ellsberg (1961) has called into question the
prevailing theory of Subjective Expected Utility due to Savage (1972).
To take into account such observed behaviors, Schmeidler (1989) has built a
new axiomatization of behavior. Under a key axiom, namely the comonotonic
independence axiom requiring that the usual independence axiom holds only
when hedging effects are absent, Schmeidler (1989) succeeded to characterize
the preferences by means of a functional that turned out to be a Choquet
integral (see Choquet (1953)). Moreover not only Schmeidler’s model explains
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paradoxes as Ellsberg’s one, but it also offers simple and flexible representa-
tions and allows for more diversified patterns of behavior related to uncer-
tainty aversion, by taking into account hedging effects (see e.g Schmeidler
(1989), Chateauneuf (1994), and Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002)).
The so-called Choquet expected utility model presented above, as well as the
classical Savage’s model and most models in utility theory, are cardinal. That
is, they deal with utility functions which are real-valued, and use standard
operations of arithmetic like addition and multiplication.
However, it is not always easy nor desirable to deal with cardinal utility func-
tions. A first noticing is that ordinal information is easier to get than cardinal
one, and moreover, there are many situations where only order is relevant,
cardinals being merely used by tradition and convenience. More fundamen-
tally, the dominant viewpoint in economics, introduced by Hicks and Allen
(1934), is that utility is related to observable choices (revealed preferences),
and any introspective judgments on intensity of preference should be discarded
since meaningless. As a consequence, if the only purpose of utility is to ex-
plain choices, then utility is ordinal in nature (see a discussion on ordinal vs.
cardinal representations in the light of choice-based vs. choiceless utilities in
Abdellaoui et al. (2002)). In other domains, as social choice theory and subjec-
tive evaluation, that is, evaluation by human subjects, ordinal representation
is central. The latter typically addresses consumer opinion polls, evaluation of
consumer goods (audio components, food and beverages, cosmetics) Grabisch
et al. (1997), evaluation of workload and mental stress Cooper and Harper
(1969); Reid and Nygren (1988), comfort Grabisch et al. (2002), etc.
It is known from measurement theory that the use of ordinal scales forbids
common arithmetical operations like addition, multiplication, which require
a richer scale to be meaningful (see, e.g.,Roberts (1979)). Hence, only com-
parisons operations are allowed, typically minimum and maximum, which we
denote in the sequel by ∧ and ∨ respectively. A key problem is then to find
within this restricted toolbox, a substitute for the Choquet integral, which
would allow for uncertainty representations able to cope with Ellsberg’s para-
dox and other phenomena of uncertainty aversion. A fundamental result due
to Marichal (2001) shows that more or less there is no other choice than the
so-called Sugeno integral (see Sugeno (1974)). Specifically, let us consider any
ordinal scale E with endpoints denoted by 0 and 1. We call Boolean poly-
nomial any expression P (x1, . . . , xn) formed by variables valued in E, con-
stants in E, linked by an arbitrary combination of parentheses, ∨ and ∧, e.g.,
((α ∧ x1) ∨ (x2 ∧ (β ∨ x3))) ∧ x4. Then P (0, . . . , 0) = 0 and P (1, . . . , 1) = 1
if and only if P is a Sugeno integral. This shows that in the ordinal case, we
are forced to use the Sugeno integral. Then remains the question of studying
the ability of the Sugeno integral to represent various attitude towards uncer-
tainty, and eventually, to provide an axiomatization of what could be called a
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Sugeno expected utility model.
If the Sugeno integral has been rather well studied under a mathematical point
of view (see, e.g.,Marichal (2000, 2001)), there are very few studies devoted
to the use of the Sugeno integral in a decision theoretic framework (see a
survey on this topic by Dubois et al. (2001a)), with a notable exception of an
axiomatization a` la Savage due to Dubois et al. (2001b). Our work provides
an alternative axiomatization, more in the spirit of Schmeidler’s work for the
Choquet integral, mainly based on hedging effects, a very intuitive way of
defining uncertainty aversion and uncertainty seeking. We will come up with a
strong and a weak definition of uncertainty aversion (resp. seeking), providing
a new characterization of necessity measures in terms of pessimism (resp.,
of possibility measures in terms of optimism). For conducting mathematical
proofs, we will need an infinite ordinal scale, as defined in Section 2. This of
course does not prevent the use of the Sugeno expected utility model on finite
ordinal scales.
2 Framework and notations
2.1 Algebraic and topological properties
Let (E,≤) be a set endowed with a total order ≤ (a binary relation transitive,
antisymmetric, and total). In addition, we assume the existence of a smallest
element 0 ∈ E and a greatest element 1 ∈ E. The asymmetric part of ≤ is
denoted by <.
In the sequel since we only consider total orders and totally ordered
sets, order and ordered will be short for total order and totally
ordered.
Definition 1 Let (E,≤) and (F,≤′) be ordered sets.
• An homomorphism f of (E,≤) into (F,≤′) is a mapping f : E → F such
that
x ≤ y ⇔ f(x) ≤′ f(y).
• If moreover f is bijective, then f is an isomorphism.
Intervals of the set E are defined as usually: for all x, y ∈ E,
[x, y] = {z ∈ E | x ≤ z ≤ y} , [x, y) = {z ∈ E | x ≤ z < y} ,
(x, y) = {z ∈ E | x < z < y} , (x, y] = {z ∈ E | x < z ≤ y} .
3
Hence, we associate to (E,≤) a topology called order topology and denoted
by R (see Cohen and Girard (1971)) 1 :
Definition 2 The order topology, R, on an ordered set (E,≤) is the topology
generated by the intervals (0, x) and (x, 1) ∀x ∈ E.
Then, (E,≤,R) is a topological ordered set.
In this paper, we consider an ordered set (E,≤) endowed with the order
topology R. Note that every homomorphism f is continuous from E to f(E)
according to the order topology.
We are going to give the definitions of connected and separable sets.
Definition 3 A topological ordered set (E,≤,R)
• is connected if and only if
· it is “without gap”: for all x, y ∈ E such that x < y there exists z ∈ E
which satisfies x < z < y;
· it is complete: each non-empty and bounded subset has a least upper bound.
• is separable if E contains a countable set A such that
∀x, y ∈ E such that x < y, ∃a ∈ A such that x < a < y.
Such a countable set A will be called an order dense subset of E.
To conclude we have the following result due to Eilenberg (1941):
Theorem 4 A topological separable, connected and ordered set (E,≤,R) is
isomorphic to a real interval.
2.2 Definitions of capacities and the Sugeno integral
In the sequel we will assume (E,≤,R) totally ordered, separable, connected,
and with a smallest element and a greatest element respectively denoted by 0
and 1. We denote Ed an order dense subset of E. From Theorem 4, clearly in
such a case, (E,≤,R) is isomorphic to the compact interval [0, 1].
All elements x, y ∈ E have a least upper bound denoted x ∨ y and a greatest
lower bound denoted x ∧ y.
Let S be a set (of possible states of nature) endowed with a σ-algebra of events
a (i.e subsets of S) and V = {X : S → E | X is a−measurable} be the set
of a -measurable functions.
1 Note that this topology exists for lattices Birkhoff (1967).
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In the sequel, we use the following standard notations:
• {Xn}n∈IN , X ∈ V and Xn ↑C.S X for simple monotone nondecreasing con-
vergence.
• For every A ∈ a, A∗ denotes the characteristic function of A that is A∗(s) =
1 for all s ∈ A, and A∗(s) = 0 for all s 6∈ A.
• For all a ∈ E, we denote by a.S∗ the function equal to a everywhere.
To begin we give the definitions of capacities and of the Sugeno integral, in
our ordinal framework.
Definition 5 A normalized capacity is a function v : a → E such that
v (∅) = 0, v (S) = 1, A ⊆ B ⇒ v (A) ≤ v (B) .
Let {An}n∈IN be a sequence in a and A ∈ a :
• An ↑ A if and only if for all n, An ⊆ An+1 and
⋃
n∈IN
An = A.
• An ↓ A if and only if for all n, An+1 ⊆ An and
⋂
n∈IN
An = A.
Definition 6 • A capacity v is inner-continuous if An, A ∈ a, An ↑ A im-
plies v (An) ↑ v (A).
• A capacity v is outer-continuous if An, A ∈ a, An ↓ A implies v (An) ↓
v (A).
Some particular capacities are used in this paper: the possibility measures and
the necessity measures.
Definition 7 A possibility measure Π is a normalized capacity such that:
∀A,B ∈ a, Π (A ∪ B) = Π (A) ∨ Π (B) .
Note that for A ∈ a, we have either Π(A) = 1 or Π(S \ A) = 1 or both (at
least A or its complement is fully possible).
Definition 8 A necessity measure (or certainty measure) N is a normalized
capacity such that:
∀A,B ∈ a, N (A ∩B) = N (A) ∧N (B) .
Similarly, note that for A ∈ a, we have either N (A) = 0 or N (S \ A) = 0 or
both (at least there is no certainty on A or on its complement). More on the
semantics attached to possibility and necessity measures can be found in the
works of Dubois and Prade (see, e.g., Dubois et al. (2000)).
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Now we give the definition of the Sugeno integral in our ordinal context as it
is defined when E = [0, 1].
Definition 9 For all X ∈ V and v a capacity defined on a, the Sugeno
integral of X with respect to v is:∫
−Xdv = ∨ (t ∧ v (X ≥ t))
t ∈ E
We provide some comments and examples for illustration. Let us consider for
simplicity that S is a finite set, say S = {s1, . . . , sn}, and take a = 2S. Then
it is easy to see that the Sugeno integral can be rewritten as follows, for any
function X : S → E: ∫
−Xdv =
n∨
i=1
(
X(sσ(i)) ∧ v(Aσ(i))
)
,
where σ is a permutation on S so that X is nondecreasing, i.e., X(sσ(1)) ≤
X(sσ(2)) ≤ · · · ≤ X(sσ(n)), and Aσ(i) = {sσ(i), sσ(i+1), . . . , sσ(n)}.
To see how the formula works, let us consider the very simple case S = {s1, s2},
and consider some act X, assuming w.l.o.g. X(s1) < X(s2). Then we get, since
v(S) = 1,∫
−Xdv = X(s1) ∨ (X(s2) ∧ v({s2})) = med(X(s1), X(s2), v({s2}),
as it can be checked (med indicates the median of a sequence). It can be proven
than the expression with the median always holds in the general (but finite)
case, that is:∫
−Xdv = med(X(s1), . . . , X(sn), v(Aσ(2)), . . . , v(Aσ(n)))
using the above notation. Coming back to our example with 2 states of nature,
we readily see that:
• If state s2 (that is, the state with good consequence) has a high certainty
value, supposing that X(s1) ≤ X(s2) ≤ v({s2}), then ∫−Xdv = X(s2). The
act is evaluated like its best outcome, and the bad outcome is forgotten.
Note that if s1 has also a high certainty value (this could be the case if v is
a possibility measure), then the model reflects optimism.
• Conversely, if the state of good consequence has a low certainty, that is,
we have v({s2}) ≤ X(s1) ≤ X(s2), then ∫−Xdv = X(s1), and the act is
evaluated as its worst consequence, since it is believed that s1 will occur.
Again, note that if s1 has also a low certainty (which could be the case if v is
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a certainty measure), then the model depicts pessimism. These two features
(optimism with a possibility measure, pessimism with a certainty measure),
have been already remarked by Dubois et al, although in different terms.
• Finally, suppose that X(s1) ≤ v({s2}) ≤ X(s2). Then surprisingly ∫−Xdv =
v({s2}), that is, the act is evaluated as the certainty of the state of good
consequence. This configuration depicts a situation where the certainty of
the good consequence is not enough high (compared to the utility of the
outcome), so that the utility of the act is limited by the certainty of the
”good” state. It may be surprising to have certainty and utility on the
same scale, however this is similar to what is done in the Savage axiomatic,
through Axiom S3 and binary acts, which infer a preference relation on
events.
As a final illustration, let us translate the famous Savage’s omelette example
into our framework (this is borrowed from Dubois et al. (2001b)).
Example 10 Suppose that one wants to make a six eggs omelette, and already
a 5 eggs omelette is ready. The decision problem is to know whether to add
or not a 6th egg, being unsure of its freshness. Hence, we have two states of
nature:
• s1: the egg is rotten
• s2: the egg is fresh.
The decision maker can choose between 3 acts:
• X: break the 6th egg into the omelette
• Y : break the 6th egg into a bowl, to verify its freshness
• Z: throw away the egg.
The consequences are, ranked from best to worst:
• X(s2): we obtain a 6 eggs omelette
• Y (s2): we obtain a 6 eggs omelette, but a bowl to wash
• Z(s1): we obtain a 5 eggs omelette
• Y (s1): we obtain a 5 eggs omelette, plus a bowl to wash
• Z(s2): we obtain a 5 eggs omelette, and an egg is wasted
• X(s1): the omelette is wasted.
These consequences being ranked and supposing there is no indifference between
any two of them, we may create the ordinal scale E = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and
assign each degree to the consequences according to the above order: X(s2) = 5,
etc.
Let us take as model the Sugeno integral w.r.t a necessity measure N ,that is,
according to our preceding analysis, a pessimistic model. Denote for simplicity
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the necessity measure of s1 and s2 by n1, n2 respectively. Note that necessarily
n1 ∧ n2 = 0. Using the above formula, we easily obtain:∫
−XdN = n2∫
−Y dN = (n2 ∨ 2) ∧ 4∫
−ZdN = 1 if n2 > 0, else (n1 ∨ 1) ∧ 3.
The following can be said.
• If n2 = 5 (the egg is fresh for sure), then the best is to break it into the
omelette (X).
• If n2 ∈ {2, 3, 4} (we are more or less sure that the egg is fresh), we may
break it into the omelette (X) or in a bowl (Y ).
• If n2 < 2 and n1 < 2 (we have very few evidence that the egg is fresh and
very few evidence that the egg is rotten: state of ignorance), then we break
the egg into a bowl (Y ).
• If n1 > 2 (we think that the egg is rotten), then we throw it away (Z).
Observe how close to human intuition is the Sugeno integral model, and how
it works with a very limited material.
2.3 Characterization of the Sugeno integral
To begin with, we need preliminary results. It is easy to check the following
lemma.
Lemma 11 If {an}n∈N ⊂ E is a nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing) sequence
in (E,≤,R), then {an}n∈N converges in E toward its least upper bound (resp.
greatest lower bound).
Lemma 12 For all a-measurable functions X ∈ V , there exists {Xn}n∈N a
nondecreasing sequence of finite step functions which converges toward X.
Proof : Let Ed = {ek}k∈N be an order-dense subset of E. We define
Xn =
n∨
k=0
(ek ∧ {X ≥ ek}∗) .
{Xn}n∈N is a nondecreasing sequence such that Xn ≤ X, ∀n.
Let s ∈ S be such that X(s) > 0.
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For each neighborhood VX(s) of X(s), there exists ek ∈ VX(s) ∩ Ed and
ek ≤ X(s). Then, Xk satisfies ek ≤ Xk(s) ≤ X(s). Consequently, since
{Xn(s)}n∈IN is nondecreasing, {Xn(s)}n∈IN converges to X(s). To prove a
theorem of inner-continuity of the Sugeno integral, we need a preliminary
result.
Lemma 13
∀X ∈ V,
∫
−Xdv = ∨
t∈E
t ∧ v (X > t) .
Proof : For every t ∈ E, {X > t} ⊆ {X ≥ t}. v is a monotonic capacity so
v (X > t) ≤ v (X ≥ t) and ∨
t∈E
t ∧ v (X > t) ≤
∫
−Xdv.
Let us show that
∨
t∈E
t ∧ v (X > t) <
∫
−Xdv is impossible.
We name m =
∨
t∈E
t∧v (X > t) and M =
∫
−Xdv and we suppose that m < M .
By hypothesis, E is connected so there exist α ∈ E such that m < α < M .
α <
∨
t∈E
t ∧ v (X ≥ t), so there exists t0 such that α < t0 ∧ v (X ≥ t0) which
entails α < t0, so {X ≥ t0} ⊆ {X > α}. v is monotonic entails v (X ≥ t0) ≤
v (X > α) hence α < v (X ≥ t0) implies α < v (X > α) and therefore: α ∧
v (X > α) = α. Consequently,
∨
t∈E
t ∧ v (X > t) ≥ α which is impossible by
hypothesis.
From Lemma 13 we obtain that for the Sugeno integral, as for the Choquet
integral, the integrand can be written indifferently with weak or strict inequal-
ities.
Lemma 14 Let X ∈ V , {Xn}n∈N a nondecreasing sequence in V such that
Xn ↑C.S X, and v be an inner-continuous capacity. Then,
lim
n→∞
∫
−Xndv =
∫
−Xdv.
Proof : From Lemma 13 we have,
∫
−Xdv = ∨
t∈E
t∧v (X > t) . Since for a given
t in E, {Xn > t} ↑ {X > t}, v monotone implies v (Xn > t) ≤ v (X > t), and
therefore
∫
−Xndv ≤
∨
t∈E
(t ∧ v (X > t)) =
∫
−Xdv.
∫
−Xndv is a nondecreasing se-
quence in E, therefore lim
n→∞
∫
−Xndv =
∨
n
∫
−Xndv ≤
∫
−Xdv. LetM = ∨
n
∫
−Xndv,
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hence Lemma 13 implies that for a given t, t∧v (Xn > t) ≤M , ∀n ∈ N. Inner-
continuity of v implies t∧v (X > t) ≤M , hence
∫
−Xdv = ∨
t∈E
(t ∧ v (X > t)) ≤
lim
n→∞
∫
−Xndv which completes the proof.
Note that these results remain obviously valid if E is the real interval [0, 1].
In this paper, we focus on inner-continuity, but to better understand the
Sugeno integral we study also outer-continuity. Moreover, our proofs aim at
making more precise those offered by Sugeno (1974) where the capacity v
was (right at the beginning) assumed to be inner and outer continuous (see
Sugeno’s definition of fuzzy measures and of fuzzy integrals).
Lemma 15 Let X ∈ V , {Xn}n∈N a nonincreasing sequence of V such that
Xn ↓C.S X, and v an outer-continuous capacity. Then,
lim
n→∞
∫
−Xndv =
∫
−Xdv.
Proof : Let X ∈ V , {Xn}n∈N a nonincreasing sequence of V such that
Xn ↓C.S X, hence ∀n ∈ N, ∀t ∈ E, {Xn ≥ t} ↓ {X ≥ t}. v is monotonic,
so ∀t, v (Xn ≥ t) ≥ v (X ≥ t). Consequently, for every t ∈ E we have for all
n ∈ N, t ∧ v (X ≥ t) ≤ t ∧ v (Xn ≥ t) ≤
∨
x∈E
(x ∧ v (Xn ≥ x)) =
∫
−Xndv. So∫
−Xdv ≤
∫
−Xndv, for all n ∈ N, hence
∫
−Xdv ≤ ∧
n∈N
∫
−Xndv.
Since
∫
−Xndv is a nonincreasing sequence in E,
∧
n∈N
∫
−Xndv = lim
n→∞
∫
−Xndv and
therefore
∫
−Xdv ≤ lim
n→∞
∫
−Xndv.
Let us show that
∫
−Xdv < ∧
n∈N
∫
−Xndv is impossible.
We name m =
∫
−Xdv, M = ∧
n∈N
∫
−Xndv and we suppose m < M . E is con-
nected so there exists α ∈ E such that m < α < M.
α <
∧
n∈N
∫
−Xndv entails that for all n ∈ N, α <
∫
−Xndv =
∨
t∈E
(t ∧ v (Xn ≥ t)) .
Consequently, ∀n, ∃tn ∈ E such that tn ∧ v (Xn ≥ tn) > α.
We put t′ =
∧
n
tn. For every n, tn ≥ tn ∧ v (Xn ≥ tn) > α so t′ ≥ α.
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t′ ≤ tn implies v (Xn ≥ t′) ≥ v (Xn ≥ tn) ≥ tn ∧ v (Xn ≥ tn) ≥ α. Conse-
quently, t′ ∧ v (Xn ≥ t′) ≥ α for every n hence
∧
n
(t′ ∧ v (Xn ≥ t′)) ≥ α. v is
outer-continuous so v (Xn ≥ t′) ↓ v (X ≥ t′) and t′ ∧ v (X ≥ t′) ≥ α which im-
plies
∫
−Xdv ≥ α. To conclude this is impossible because we have
∫
−Xdv < α.
Specific pairs of functions, called comonotonic functions, play a crucial role.
Definition 16 X, Y ∈ V are said to be comonotonic if
X(s0) < X(s1)⇒ Y (s0) ≤ Y (s1), ∀s0, s1 ∈ S.
In our framework, the Sugeno integral satisfies the following usual properties
proved by Denneberg and Grabisch (2004) in an ordinal scale case and Sugeno
(1974) in the standard [0, 1] case.
Property 1 (1) X,X ′ ∈ V comonotonic ⇒
∫
−X ∨X ′dv =
∫
−Xdv ∨
∫
−X ′dv,
(2) X,X ′ ∈ V comonotonic ⇒
∫
−X ∧X ′dv =
∫
−Xdv ∧
∫
−X ′dv,
(3) v is a necessity measure ⇔ ∀X,X ′ ∈ V
∫
−X ∧X ′dv =
∫
−Xdv ∧
∫
−X ′dv,
(4) v is a possibility measure ⇔ ∀X,X ′ ∈ V
∫
−X ∨X ′dv =
∫
−Xdv ∨
∫
−X ′dv.
Proof :
1. Let us prove that X,X ′ ∈ V comonotonic ⇒
∫
−X ∨X ′dv =
∫
−Xdv ∨
∫
−X ′dv.
Let X,X ′ ∈ V be comonotonic functions.∫
−Xdv∨
∫
−X ′dv ≤
∫
−X∨X ′dv since the Sugeno integral is clearly monotone
with respect to the integrand i.e X, Y ∈ V, X ≤ Y implies
∫
−Xdv ≤
∫
−Y dv.
Let us show that
∫
−X ∨X ′dv ≤
∫
−Xdv ∨
∫
−X ′dv.
X is comonotonic with X ′ so for every t ∈ E, {X ≥ t} ⊆ {X ′ ≥ t} or the
converse.
• If {X ≥ t} ⊆ {X ′ ≥ t} for every t ∈ E then from Definition 9 of the
Sugeno integral
∫
−Xdv ≤
∫
−X ′dv; note also that {X ∨X ′ ≥ t} ⊆ {X ′ ≥ t}
since {X ∨X ′ ≥ t} ⊆ {X ≥ t} ∪ {X ′ ≥ t} hence
∫
−X ∨ X ′dv ≤
∫
−X ′dv,
therefore
∫
−X ∨X ′dv ≤
∫
−Xdv ∨
∫
−X ′dv.
• If {X ′ ≥ t} ⊆ {X ≥ t} for every t ∈ E, a similar reasoning gives the
desired result.
2. Let us prove that X,X ′ ∈ V comonotonic ⇒
∫
−X ∧X ′dv =
∫
−Xdv ∧
∫
−X ′dv.
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Let X,X ′ ∈ V be comonotonic functions.∫
−X ∧X ′dv ≤
∫
−Xdv∧
∫
−X ′dv since the Sugeno integral is monotone. Let
us show that
∫
−Xdv ∧
∫
−X ′dv ≤
∫
−X ∧ X ′dv. To do this we are going to
prove that
∫
−X ∧X ′dv <
∫
−Xdv ∧
∫
−X ′dv is impossible.
We name m =
∫
−X ∧X ′dv and M =
∫
−Xdv ∧
∫
−X ′dv.
Since E is connected there exists α ∈ E such that m < α < M . α <
M implies that there exist t0, t1 ∈ E such that α < t0 ∧ v (X ≥ t0) and
α < t1 ∧ v (X ≥ t1). The same reasoning as in Lemma 13 then entails:
α ∧ v (X ≥ α) = α and α ∧ v (X ′ ≥ α) = α. X is comonotonic with X ′ so
{X ≥ α} ⊆ {X ′ ≥ α} or the converse.
• If {X ≥ α} ⊆ {X ′ ≥ α}, it comes {X ≥ α} ⊆ {X ∧X ′ ≥ α}, and there-
fore α ∧ v (X ≥ α) ≤ α ∧ v (X ∧X ′ ≥ α), hence α ≤ m a contradiction.
• The same contradiction arises if {X ′ ≥ α} ⊆ {X ≥ α}, which completes
the proof.
3. Let us prove that
v is a necessity measure ⇔ ∀X,X ′ ∈ V
∫
−X ∧X ′dv =
∫
−Xdv ∧
∫
−X ′dv.
We consider X,X ′ ∈ V and v a necessity measure.∫
−X ∧X ′dv ≤
∫
−Xdv∧
∫
−X ′dv since the Sugeno integral is nondecreasing.
Let us show that
∫
−Xdv∧
∫
−X ′dv ≤
∫
−X ∧X ′dv. We just have to prove that∫
−X ∧X ′dv <
∫
−Xdv ∧
∫
−X ′dv is impossible.
We name m =
∫
−X ∧X ′dv and M =
∫
−Xdv ∧
∫
−X ′dv.
As previously there exists α ∈ E such that m < α < M , and one
obtains α ∧ v (X ≥ α) = α and α ∧ v (X ′ ≥ α) = α. Consequently, α =
α ∧ (v (X ≥ α) ∧ v (X ′ ≥ α)), but {X ≥ α} ∩ {X ′ ≥ α} = {X ∧X ′ ≥ α}.
Since v is a necessity measure v (X ≥ α) ∧ v (X ′ ≥ α) = v (X ∧X ′ ≥ α) .
Therefore α = α ∧ v (X ∧X ′ ≥ α), hence α ≤ m, a contradiction which
completes the proof.
The converse is immediate. Let A,B ∈ a and let X = A∗ and X ′ = B∗,
the result comes immediately from A∗ ∧ B∗ = (A ∩ B)∗ .
4. Let us prove that
v is a possibility measure ⇔ ∀X,X ′ ∈ V
∫
−X ∨X ′dv =
∫
−Xdv ∨
∫
−X ′dv.
We consider X,X ′ ∈ V and v a possibility measure.∫
−Xdv∨
∫
−X ′dv ≤
∫
−X ∨X ′dv since the Sugeno integral is nondecreasing.
Let us prove that
∫
−X ∨X ′dv ≤
∫
−Xdv ∨
∫
−X ′dv.
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For every t ∈ E, {X ∨X ′ ≥ t} = {X ≥ t} ∪ {X ′ ≥ t} and v is a pos-
sibility measure so v (X ∨X ′ ≥ t) = v (X ≥ t) ∨ v (X ′ ≥ t) . So for every
t ∈ E, t ∧ v (X ∨X ′ ≥ t) = t ∧ (v (X ≥ t) ∨ v (X ′ ≥ t)) = (t ∧ v (X ≥ t)) ∨
(t ∧ v (X ′ ≥ t)) ≤
∫
−Xdv ∨
∫
−X ′dv. Consequently,
∫
−X ∨ X ′dv ≤
∫
−Xdv ∨∫
−X ′dv.
The converse is immediate. Let A,B ∈ a and let X = A∗ and X ′ = B∗,
the result comes immediately from A∗ ∨ B∗ = (A ∪ B)∗ .
To conclude this section, we characterize the Sugeno integral.
Theorem 17 A functional I : V → E satisfies
(a) I (a.S∗) = a, ∀a ∈ E
(b) X, Y ∈ V comonotonic ⇒ I (X ∨ Y ) = I (X) ∨ I (Y )
(c) X, Y ∈ V comonotonic ⇒ I (X ∧ Y ) = I (X) ∧ I (Y )
(d) Xn ↑C.S X ⇒ I (Xn) ↑ I (X)
if and only if I is a Sugeno integral with respect to a unique inner-continuous
capacity v.
Proof : We assume I : V → E a functional which satisfies properties (a)-(d).
Let us prove that I is a Sugeno integral with respect to an inner-continuous
capacity.
First we consider a finite step function X ∈ V .
Let xi, i = 1, . . . , n be the values of the function X, without loss of
generality, we can suppose x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn, hence X =
n∨
i=1
xi ∧ {X ≥ xi}∗ .
We denote Xi = xi ∧ {X ≥ xi}∗ .
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, Xi and
n∨
j=i+1
Xj are comonotonic, so with (b),
I (X) =
n∨
i=1
I (xi ∧ {X ≥ xi}∗) . The function xi.S∗ is constant consequently
Hypotheses (c) and (a) entail I (X) =
n∨
i=1
xi ∧ I ({X ≥ xi}∗) .
The set function v : a → E defined by v (A) = I (A∗) ∀A ∈ a is an
inner-continuous capacity:
• Hypothesis (a) implies v (∅) = I(0) = 0;
• Hypothesis (a) implies v (S) = I(S∗) = 1;
• Let A ⊆ B ⊆ S. The functions A∗ and B∗ are comonotonic such that
A∗ ≤ B∗. According to (b), I (B∗) = I (A∗) ∨ I (B∗), so I (A∗) ≤ I (B∗).
In other words, v (A) ≤ v (B) .
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• We consider {An} ⊆ a, A ∈ a such that An ↑ A, v (An) = I (A∗n) and
according to Hypothesis (d), I (A∗n) ↑ I (A∗) = v (A) .
Consequently, I (X) is a Sugeno integral of X with respect to the inner-
continuous capacity v.
Let X ∈ V be a a -measurable function
Lemma 12 implies that there exists {Xn}n∈N a nondecreasing sequence of
step functions in V such that Xn ↑C.S X. According to the first part of the
proof, I (Xn) =
∫
−Xndv. Hypothesis (d) implies that I (Xn) tends to I (X)
and according to Lemma 14
∫
−Xndv converges to
∫
−Xdv, so I (X) =
∫
−Xdv.
For the converse, Property 1 and Lemma 14 entail that the Sugeno integral
with respect to a unique inner-continuous capacity satisfies properties (a) −
(d).
3 Preferences and certainty equivalent
We consider a decision maker (DM), who is supposed to face uncertainty
(objective probabilistic information concerning the occurrence of events is not
available to him) and has to choose among acts X ∈ V .
The preference relation  on V of the (DM) is a total preorder  (a binary
relation complete, reflexive and transitive) 2 .
First we state three axioms which are usual and natural requirements, what-
ever the attitude toward uncertainty may be.
A.1  is a non-trivial total preorder,
A.2 Continuity with respect to simple monotone convergence
A.21 {an}n∈IN , a ∈ E, Y ∈ V, an ↓ a, an.S∗  Y ⇒ a.S  Y ,
A.22 {Xn}n∈IN , X, Y ∈ V, Y  Xn, Xn ↑C.S X ⇒ Y  X,
A.3 Monotonicity
A.31 X ≥ Y ⇒ X  Y ,
A.32 a, b ∈ E, a > b⇒ a.S∗  b.S∗.
It is straightforward to see that the previous axioms characterize the existence
for every act X of a certainty equivalent I(X) ∈ E, where I : V → E is
monotone, monotonously continuous, and represents the preference relation
 (we nevertheless give a proof below for sake of completeness). Namely:
2 Thus for any pair of acts X,Y, X  Y will read X is (weakly) preferred to Y by
the (DM); X  Y means X is strictly preferred to Y , and X ∼ Y means X and Y
are considered as indifferent by the (DM).
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Lemma 18 A preference relation  on V satisfies axioms A.1−A.3 if and
only if for every act X ∈ V there exists a unique element I(X) ∈ E such that:
(i) X ∼ I(X).S∗,
(ii) X, Y ∈ V, X  Y ⇔ I(X) ≥ I(Y ),
(iii) X ≥ Y ⇒ I(X) ≥ I(Y ),
(iv) {Xn}n∈IN , X ∈ V, Xn ↑C.S X ⇒ I(Xn) ↑ I(X).
The indifference relation X ∼ I(X).S∗ clearly justifies the denomination of
I(X) as the certainty equivalent of X.
Proof :
First we suppose that the preference relation  satisfies axioms A.1 - A.3.
Let us prove (i)
Let X in V . We define GX = {a ∈ E | a.S∗  X}. 0 ∈ GX and ∀a ∈
GX , a ≤ 1. E is complete, so GX has a least upper bound. We name
I (X) = supGX . Axiom A.22 implies I (X) .S
∗  X, consequently, (i)
follows as soon as we can show X  I (X) .S∗, since the uniqueness is
proved by axiom A.32.
• If I (X) = 1, clearly X  I (X) .S∗ by axiom A.31.
• If I (X) 6= 1, E is separable so we can build a sequence {an}n∈IN
in Ed (the order dense subset of E) such that I (X) < an < 1,
an+1 ≤ an, ∀n ∈ N and an ↓ I (X). The elements an do not below to
GX and  is a total preorder so ∀n ∈ N an.S∗  X. Consequently,
Axiom A.21 entails X  I (X) .S∗.
Let us prove (ii)
If we consider X, Y in V such that X  Y , then GY ⊆ GX and one
obtains I (X) ≤ I (Y ) .
If we consider X, Y in V such that I (X) ≥ I (Y ), then Axiom A.31
entails I (X) .S∗  I (Y ) .S∗. As I (Y ) .S∗ ∼ Y and I (X) .S∗ ∼ X, the
transitivity of the preference relation  implies that X  Y.
Let us prove (iii)
If we consider X, Y in V such that X ≥ Y , then according to Axiom
A.31 we have X  Y , hence (ii) implies I (X) ≥ I (Y ).
Let us prove (iv)
Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence in V such that Xn ↑C.S X in V . Then, for
all n ∈ N,
Xn  Xn+1 ⇒ I (Xn) ≤ I (Xn+1) ,
Xn  X ⇒ I (Xn) ≤ I (X) .
So the sequence {I (Xn)}n∈N is a nondecreasing sequence upper bounded
in E. According to Lemma 11, this sequence converges to its least upper
bound l. It is easy to check, l ≤ I (X) , let us prove I (X) ≤ l.
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I (Xn) ↑ l, so Xn  l.S∗. Since Xn ↑C.S X, Axiom A.22 entails X 
l.S∗ which is equivalent to I (X) ≤ l.
In conclusion we have proved that I (Xn) converges to I (X).
Now Axioms (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are satisfied.
Axiom A.1 is a consequence of (ii).
Let us prove A.2
Let Y be in V and {an}n∈N ⊆ E be a sequence such that an ↓ a, and
an.S
∗  Y .
If we suppose a.S∗ ≺ Y , then hypothesis (ii) entails a < I (Y ). The
interval [a, I (Y )] contains an open neighborhood of a, so there exists
N ∈ N such that aN < I (Y ) . Hypothesis (ii) implies aN .S∗ ≺ Y which
is in contradiction with the hypothesis an.S
∗  Y, ∀n ∈ N. So Axiom
A.21 is proved.
Let X, Y ∈ V and {Xn}n∈N ∈ V be a sequence such that Xn ↑C.S X
and Xn  Y . Properties (ii) and (iv) imply I (Xn) ↑ I (X) and I (Xn) ≤
I (Y ), so I (X) ≤ I (Y ) and X  Y . Then A.22 is proved.
Let us prove Axiom A.3
It is easy to check Axiom A.31 with Axioms (iii) and (ii), and finally
Axiom A.32 is proved by Axioms (i) and (ii).
4 Preferences and Sugeno integral
We now introduce the crucial axiom A.4 of comonotonic independence which
parallels a similar one for axiomatizing a simplified version of Schmeidler’s
model 3 (see for instance Chateauneuf (1994)).
A.4 Comonotonic independence
If X, Y, Z ∈ V are acts such that Z is comonotonic with X and Y , then:
A.41 X ∼ Y ⇒ X ∨ Z ∼ Y ∨ Z,
A.42 X ∼ Y ⇒ X ∧ Z ∼ Y ∧ Z.
Roughly speaking, comonotonic independence requires the direction of pref-
erence to be retained, provided hedging is not involved.
Property 2 Let  be a preference relation on V which satisfies Axioms A.1-
3 For the Schmeidler’s model or else the Choquet integral, A.4.1 and A.4.2 reduce
to a unique implication where + stands in place of ∨ (resp. ∧).
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A.3. Then,
A.41⇔ [X, Y ∈ V comonotonic⇒ I (X ∨ Y ) = I (X) ∨ I (Y )] ,
A.42⇔ [X, Y ∈ V comonotonic⇒ I (X ∧ Y ) = I (X) ∧ I (Y )] ,
Proof : We suppose Axiom A.41 satisfied and we consider X, Y ∈ V two
comonotonic functions.npreuve
X ∼ I (X) .S∗, and I (X) .S∗ is a constant function, so Axiom A.41 im-
plies X ∨ Y ∼ I (X) .S∗ ∨ Y . By a similar proof, we get I (X) .S∗ ∨ Y ∼
(I (X) ∨ I (Y )) .S∗. So X ∨ Y ∼ (I (X) ∨ I (Y )).S∗. The uniqueness of the
certainty equivalent completes the proof.
Let us show the converse. We consider X, Y, Z ∈ V such that X ∼ Y and
Z comonotonic with X and Y . Hence, I (X ∨ Z) = I (X) ∨ I (Z) = I (Y ) ∨
I (Z) = I (Y ∨ Z) , in other words X ∨ Z ∼ Y ∨ Z.
The proof of the second equivalence is similar.
Theorem 19 For a preference relation  on V the following assertions are
equivalent:
(i)  satisfies axioms A.1,A.2,A.3 and A.4
(ii) each act X ∈ V has a certainty equivalent I (X) and there exists a unique
inner-continuous normalized capacity v on a such that
∀X ∈ V, I (X) =
∫
−Xdv.
Proof :
(i)⇒ (ii) Axioms A.1, A.2, A.3 entail the existence and the uniqueness of
the certainty equivalent I. Axiom A.4, Property 2, Lemma 18 and Theorem
17 imply that I is a Sugeno integral with respect to an inner-continuous
normalized capacity.
(ii)⇒ (i) Theorem 17 and Lemma 18 entail the axioms A.1,A.2,A.3. Ax-
ioms A.41 and A.42 are due to (b) and (c) of Theorem 17 and Property
2.
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5 Uncertainty aversion and Sugeno integral
In this section we consider  a preference relation on V represented by a
Sugeno integral. To be more precise, the preference relation  satisfies axioms
A.1-A.4.
5.1 Strong uncertainty aversion
To understand axiom of strong uncertainty aversion we need a preliminary
result.
Property 3 Let X, Y, Z ∈ V be acts and  a preference relation on V which
satisfies A.1-A.4. Then,
X ∼ Y and Z comonotonic with Y ⇒ X ∧ Z  Y ∧ Z.
Proof : Let X, Y, Z ∈ V be acts such that X ∼ Y and Z comonotonic with
Y . According to Theorem 19, the certainty equivalent is a Sugeno integral
with respect to a unique inner-continuous normalized capacity. The certainty
equivalent is nondecreasing so, I (X ∧ Z) ≤ I (X) ∧ I (Z) = I (Y ) ∧ I (Z)
since X ∼ Y. Moreover, Axiom A.4 entails I (Y ) ∧ I (Z) = I (Y ∧ Z) so
I (X ∧ Z) ≤ I (Y ∧ Z).
The above property entails that even if there is an asymmetric reduction
of uncertainty, the (DM) can strictly prefer the more uncertain act Y ∧ Z
than the least uncertain X ∧ Z. If a decision maker, represented by a Sugeno
integral, is strongly uncertainty averse, this strict preference cannot happened.
Consequently, strong uncertainty aversion of a (DM) represented by a Sugeno
integral is given by the following axiom:
A’.4 Strong uncertainty aversion
If X, Y, Z ∈ V are acts such that Z is comonotonic with Y , then:
X ∼ Y ⇒ X ∧ Z ∼ Y ∧ Z.
Lemma 20 Under Axioms A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, Axiom A’.4 is equivalent
to
X ∼ Y ⇒ X ∧ Z ∼ Y ∧ Z, ∀Z ∈ V. (1)
Proof : It is immediate that property (1) implies A’4.
Let us prove the converse.
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We consider acts X, Y ∈ V such that X ∼ Y , Lemma 18 yields X ∼ I (X) .S∗.
Z is comonotonic with I (X) .S∗ so Axiom A’.4 implies X∧Z ∼ I (X) .S∗∧Z.
The symmetry of the hypotheses and Axiom A’.4 entail Y ∧Z ∼ I (Y ) .S∗∧Z.
X ∼ Y ⇒ I (X) .S∗ ∼ I (Y ) .S∗ and A’.4 implies I (X) .S∗∧Z ∼ I (Y ) .S∗∧Z.
Consequently, X ∧ Z ∼ Y ∧ Z.
Property 4 For a preference relation  on V satisfying Axioms A.1-A.3,
(i) and (ii) are equivalent:
(i) X ∼ Y ⇒ X ∧ Z ∼ Y ∧ Z, ∀Z ∈ V
(ii) I (X ∧ Z) = I (X) ∧ I (Z) , ∀X,Z ∈ V.
Proof :
First we suppose X ∼ Y ⇒ X ∧ Z ∼ Y ∧ Z, ∀Z ∈ V .
X ∼ I (X)S∗ entails , for all Z ∈ V , X ∧Z ∼ I (X)S∗ ∧Z. By a similar
way, one obtains: for all X,Z ∈ V , I (X) .S∗ ∧ Z ∼ (I (X) ∧ I (Z)) .S∗. So,
X ∧ Z ∼ (I (X) ∧ I (Z)) .S∗. The uniqueness of the certainty equivalent,
achieves the proof.
Now we suppose I (X ∧ Z) = I (X) ∧ I (Z) , ∀X,Z ∈ V. .
Let X, Y be acts such that X ∼ Y , hence for all Z ∈ V , I (X ∧ Z) =
I (X) ∧ I (Z) = I (Y ) ∧ I (Z) = I (Y ∧ Z) . Consequently, X ∧ Z ∼ Y ∧ Z.
Theorem 21 For a preference relation  on V , satisfying Axioms A.1,A.2,A.3
and A.4, (i) and (ii) are equivalent:
(i)  satisfies the strong uncertainty aversion axiom A’.4
(ii) There exists a unique inner-continuous necessity measure N on a such
that
∀X ∈ V, I (X) =
∫
−XdN .
Proof : We have proved Theorem 19, so we just need to show that Axiom
A’.4 is equivalent to have a necessity measure.
(i)⇒ (ii)
Axioms A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 entail from Theorem 19 that each act X ∈ V
has a certainty equivalent which is a Sugeno integral with respect to a
unique inner-continuous normalized capacity. Adding Axiom A’.4 entails
from Lemma 20 and Property 4 that I (X ∧ Z) = I (X)∧I (Z) , ∀X,Z ∈ V.
Therefore we conclude with Property 1.
(ii)⇒ (i) According to Property 1, the Sugeno integral with respect to a
necessity measure N satisfies
∫
−X ∧ Y dN =
∫
−XdN ∧
∫
−Y dN , ∀X, Y ∈ V .
Hence Theorem 19, Property 1, Property 4 and Lemma 20 give the desired
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result.
5.2 Weak uncertainty aversion
A weaker form of uncertainty aversion can be obtained:
A”.4 Weak uncertainty aversion
If X, Y, Z ∈ V are acts such that Z is comonotonic with Y and X∧Z = a.S∗
where a ∈ E then: X ∼ Y ⇒ a.S∗ ∼ Y ∧ Z.
We obtain the following characterization of weak uncertainty aversion:
Theorem 22 For a preference relation  on V , satisfying axioms A.1,A.2,A.3
and A.4, (i) and (ii) are equivalent:
(i)  satisfies the weak uncertainty aversion axiom A′′.4
(ii) there exists a unique inner-continuous normalized capacity v on a such
that
v (A) ∧ v
(
A¯
)
= 0, ∀A ∈ a, and ∀X ∈ V, I (X) =
∫
−Xdv.
Proof :
(i)⇒ (ii) Theorem 19 implies that there exists a unique inner-continuous
normalized capacity v on a such that ∀X ∈ V, I (X) =
∫
−Xdv. Let us
show that ∀A ∈ a, v (A) ∧ v
(
A¯
)
= 0.
A∗ ∼ v (A) .S∗, but v (A) .S∗ and A¯∗ are comonotonic, so the property
A∗ ∧ A¯∗ = 0.S∗ and Axiom A′′.4 give v (A) .S∗ ∧ A¯∗ ∼ 0.S∗.
We have A¯∗ ∼ v
(
A¯
)
.S∗. Moreover, v (A) .S∗ is comonotonic with A¯∗ and
v
(
A¯
)
.S∗, so Axiom A.4.1 entails A¯∗ ∧ v (A) .S∗ ∼
(
v
(
A¯
)
∧ v (A)
)
.S∗.
Consequently,
(
v
(
A¯
)
∧ v (A)
)
.S∗ ∼ 0.S∗. The uniqueness of the cer-
tainty equivalent entails v (A) ∧ v
(
A¯
)
= 0.
(ii)⇒ (i)
Let X, Y, Z ∈ V be such that X ∼ Y , Z is comonotonic with Y and
X∧Z = a.S∗. The result follows as soon as we can show that I (Y ∧ Z) = a.
• Let us show that I (Y ∧ Z) ≥ a.
From Property 3, X ∧ Z  Y ∧ Z hence a.S∗  Y ∧ Z and therefore
a ≤ I (Y ∧ Z) .
• Let us show that I (Y ∧ Z) ≤ a.
X ∧ Z = a.S∗ implies that ∀s ∈ S,X(s) ≥ a and Z(s) ≥ a.
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Let A = {s ∈ S | X(s) = a}, so asX∧Z = a.S∗ A¯ = {s ∈ S | Z(s) = a}.
By hypothesis, v (A) ∧ v
(
A¯
)
= 0 so either v (A) = 0 or v
(
A¯
)
= 0.
· if v
(
A¯
)
= 0, then I (X) =
∨
t∈E
t ∧ v (X > t) ≤ a. Consequently,
I (Y ∧ Z) ≤ I (Y ) = I (X) ≤ a.
· if v (A) = 0, then I (Z) = ∨
t∈E
t ∧ v (Z > t) ≤ a. Consequently
I (Y ∧ Z) ≤ I (Z) ≤ a, which completes the proof.
5.3 Uncertainty aversion and pessimism
In this section we argue that uncertainty aversion is intimately closely linked
to pessimism. This is first illustrated by the following example (see figure 1).
Acts are evaluated on an ordinal scale E denoted by {0, a, b, c, d, e, 1} with
0 < a < b < c < d < e < 1. This example shows that weak uncertainty
aversion expresses a kind of pessimism, and that obviously so does strong
uncertainty aversion.
c
a
b
d
a
e
a
a
a
d
and
entails
PSfrag replacements
X Y Z
∼
∼
X ∧ Z Y ∧ Z
A¯
A¯A¯
A¯
A¯
AA
AAA
Fig. 1. Pessimism
In the above example, we consider acts X, Y, Z such that X ∼ Y and Y is
comonotonic with Z. When we take the minimum X ∧ Z, uncertainty disap-
pears. Weak uncertainty aversion axiom entails that for the decision maker
(DM), X ∧ Z ∼ Y ∧ Z. So the (DM) does not take care about Y ∧ Z
(
A¯
)
=
d > a, he thinks that A¯ will not occur. Consequently, the (DM) is pessimistic.
Indeed considering the “extreme” necessity defined byN (S) = 1 andN (A) =
0 otherwise, clearly enlights the pessimistic state of mind of a (strongly) un-
certainty averse decision maker since in such a case for any X belonging to V ,
the evaluation of X is given by 4
∫
−XdN = inf
s∈S
X(s).
4 Notice that it can be proved that for a connected ordered set every non-empty
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5.4 Strong and weak uncertainty seeking
Indeed there are symmetrical uncertainty seeking axioms.
Property 5 Let X, Y, Z ∈ V be acts and  a preference relation on V satis-
fying axioms A.1-A.4. Then,
X ∼ Y and Z comonotonic with Y ⇒ X ∨ Z  Y ∨ Z.
Proof : LetX, Y, Z ∈ V be acts such thatX ∼ Y and Z comonotonic with Y .
The certainty equivalent is nondecreasing so, I (X ∨ Z) ≥ I (X) ∨ I (Z) =
I (Y ) ∨ I (Z) , since X ∼ Y. Moreover, Axiom A.4 entails I (Y ) ∨ I (Z) =
I (Y ∨ Z) .
The above property entails that even if there is an asymmetric increase of
uncertainty, the (DM) can strictly prefer the less uncertain act X∨Z than the
more uncertain Y ∨ Z. If a decision maker, represented by a Sugeno integral,
is strongly uncertainty seeking, then this strict preference cannot happen.
Consequently, strong uncertainty seeking of a (DM) represented by a Sugeno
integral is given by the following axiom:
B’.4 Strong uncertainty seeking
If X, Y, Z ∈ V are acts such that Z is comonotonic with Y , then:
X ∼ Y ⇒ X ∨ Z ∼ Y ∨ Z.
As it has be done for the risk seeking case we can show the following result:
Lemma 23 Under axioms, A.1,A.2,A.3,A.4, Axiom B′.4 is equivalent to:
X ∼ Y ⇒ X ∨ Z ∼ Y ∨ Z, ∀Z ∈ V .
A weaker form of uncertainty seeking can be obtained.
B”.4 Weak uncertainty seeking
If X, Y, Z ∈ V are acts such that Z is comonotonic with Y and X∨Z = a.S∗
where a ∈ E then: X ∼ Y ⇒ a.S∗ ∼ Y ∨ Z.
Hence we have the following results.
Theorem 24 For a preference relation  on V , satisfying Axioms A.1,A.2,A.3
and A.4, (i) and (ii) are equivalent:
bounded subset has a greatest lower bound, therefore our notation inf is consistent
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(i)  satisfies the strong uncertainty seeking axiom B’.4
(ii) There exists a unique inner-continuous possibility measure Π on a such
that
∀X ∈ V, I (X) =
∫
−XdΠ.
Theorem 25 For a preference relation  on V , satisfying axioms A.1,A.2,A.3
and A.4, (i) and (ii) are equivalent:
(i)  satisfies the weak uncertainty aversion axiom B′′.4
(ii) there exists a unique inner-continuous normalized capacity v on a such
that
v (A) ∨ v
(
A¯
)
= 1, ∀A ∈ a, and ∀X ∈ V, I (X) =
∫
−Xdv.
To end we just illustrate optimism involved by strong uncertainty seeking
through the consideration of the “extreme” possibility Π defined by
Π (A) = 1, ∀A 6= ∅, Π (∅) = 0. The formula
∫
−XdΠ = sup
s∈S
X(s) is self-
explanatory.
6 Conclusion
In this article, the Sugeno integral is characterized, in an ordinal framework,
by axioms based on the preference relation of the decision maker. Moreover
we prove that necessity measures can be characterized by a strong uncertainty
aversion axiom. On the other hand capacities merely satisfying v (A)∧v
(
A¯
)
=
0 for any event A, are shown to be related to a weaker uncertainty axiom. Fi-
nally strong and weak uncertainty seeking are dually investigated by mainly
substituting the max operator to the min one.
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